Purpose -The non-storable nature of electricity and the increasing complexity of financial instruments as a tool for hedging against risk make the area of research very useful in the real world. Many power portfolio optimization problems have been developed to combat the issue of risk tolerance, but very few (if any) have included transmission constraints. The purpose of this paper is to consider optimization of portfolios of real and contractual assets, including derivative instruments, in a multi-period setting where transmission constraints also exist. Design/methodology/approach -Rather than using a flowgate constraint as a representation of transmission congestion, the authors use fixed transmission rights. A model is introduced that involves a three-node unidirectional network in order to evaluate the significance of transmission constraints. Data from the PJM, which is located in the eastern USA, were used for model implementation. Findings -The stochastic nonlinear mixed-integer model presented shows that transmission constraints and fixed transmission rights can have a significant effect on the choices a utility will make when dealing with power procurement. It is demonstrated that the inclusions drastically decrease the value of the objective function. Research limitations/implications -Conditional value at risk (CVaR) was chosen over VaR as a risk measurement for two different reasons. First, it is important to have a good representation of the trade-off between the best expected profit and the volatility experienced when obtaining that profit. Second, it provides protection against very undesirable scenarios that may occur with low probability. In order to simplify the fixed transmission rights contracts, a three-node network is used with unidirectional flow. Practical implications -When markets were regulated, transmission lines were owned and operated by local utilities, and all power sent over the lines was either owned by the operating utility or wheeled for another utility based on existing agreements. With the advent of deregulation, utilities were forced to wheel other companies' power, which introduced more risk in terms of transmission constraints. Originality/value -The contribution of this research is to help companies not only hedge the risk of unknown power prices but also unknown transmission congestion. One distinctive feature of the authors' research is to expand upon existing "power portfolio optimization with risk" literature by introducing a transmission constraint into the model. Historically, transmission congestion has been modeled in different ways, including flowgates, transmission rents and fixed transmission rights.
Introduction
The rapid growth in derivative markets has led to a quite rich and diverse academic literature and business applications related to the problem of optimization of portfolios using forward and option instruments. The typical problem involves companies trading contracts with customers and suppliers to structure forward and options contracts. The purpose is to buy or sell contingent obligations, with financial or physical settlement, where such obligations/contracts are typically benchmarked on an underlying spot market for the commodity in question or for a close substitute. The company can meet and hedge its contingent obligations through a variety of means based on a variety of derivative contracts. The company can also build or contract for physical capacity to meet or hedge its contractual obligations.
Electric power has become a particularly popular application area for portfolio optimization. In the restructured electricity market, in order to cover the demands of their retail and wholesale customers, generators that produce electricity can either use the spot market or sign contracts with buyers of energy (typically distribution companies) that include purchases/sales for up to a few years in advance. It is also possible for both buyers and sellers to use hedge instruments to hedge against the risks. What portion of capacity or what portion of demand should be covered through spot market transactions or derivative markets is the question of interest in portfolio optimization.
The non-storable nature of electricity and the increasing complexity of financial instruments as a tool for hedging against risk make the area of research very useful in the real world. Many power portfolio optimization problems have been developed to combat the issue of risk tolerance, but very few (if any) have included transmission constraints. In this research, optimization of portfolios of real and contractual assets, including derivative instruments, in a multi-period setting is considered where transmission constraints also exist. The firm purchase power through various channels, such as spot market, forward market, power purchase agreements to satisfy random customer demand. Fixed transmission rights (FTRs) are used as a measure of transmission congestion using data from the PJM market, which is located in the Eastern USA. PJM, the most mature independent system operator, was used for model implementation because it uses a nodal pricing system (rather than a zonal average) and data are readily available from PJM's web site.
The contribution of this research is to help companies not only hedge the risk of unknown power prices but also unknown transmission congestion. The simulation results show that transmission constraints and FTRs can have a significant effect on the choices on power procurement in the presence of unknown transmission congestion. The rest of the paper is organized as follows: in the next section, the relevant literature is discussed, followed by the introduction of the model and the data in Sections 3 and 4, respectively. In Section 5, we explain the concept of FTRs. Section 6 discusses the results and Section 7 concludes.
Literature
Before deregulation, electric utilities were guaranteed the ability to recover reasonable costs incurred in providing service to their customers. As a result, they had no need to hedge against unforeseen price risks. The deregulation of electricity markets has introduced risk and uncertainty into a sector of the economy that was traditionally state-regulated. In order to manage risk from market prices, consumers and producers use financial methods to support decentralized decision making under uncertainty. Due to the non-storable nature of electricity and the unpredictable nature of demand and daily weather, risk is a real-time dilemma in the electric industry.
Unlike many commodities, electricity is expensive to store. As a result, it is consumed the instant it is produced, and any excess is dissipated. Standard risk management textbooks provide numerous formulas for valuation of derivative contracts on storable assets, but none that apply to non-storable commodities. Companies in the power sector not only have to be concerned with the sale and purchase of electricity, but also the risks involved with an unknown real-time price and transmission constraints on power flow. A comprehensive report by the Energy Information Administration (EIA, 2002) and the seminal paper by Kleindorfer and Wu (2003) provide an excellent review of financial instruments and how they can be used in power markets.
There are various ways for investors, managers, and/or a firm's owners are to take actions against risk (EIA, 2002) . One alternative for managing the risk created by fluctuating prices is to use long-term fixed-price contracts. Another alternative is using derivative contracts, such as forward transactions, future contracts, options or swaps. All forward contracts specify the type, quality, and quantity of commodity to be delivered as well as when and where delivery will take place. Like a forward contract, a futures contract obligates each party to buy or sell a specific amount of a commodity at a specified price. Unlike a forward contract, buyers and sellers of futures contracts deal with an exchange, not with each other. An option is a contract that gives the buyer of the contract the right to buy (a call option) or sell (a put option) at a specified price (the "strike price") over a specified period of time. A swap contract is an agreement between two parties to exchange a series of cash flows generated by underlying assets. No physical commodity is actually transferred between the buyer and seller. Kleindorfer and Li (2005) considered a multi-period setting with a value-at-risk (VaR) constraint as the risk measure. The standard definition of a VaR portfolio is the maximum loss that the portfolio is allowed to sustain over a specified period of time and at a specified level of probability. The authors developed a model based on an efficient frontier of possible profit and VaR expectations to find an efficient frontier, which maximizes profit and minimizes risk, for an optimal portfolio of financial instruments. A Monte-Carlo simulation was run in order to obtain statistical measures including mean, standard deviation, and covariance, which shows that the additional generation improves the efficiency frontier. Our research aims to extend the approach in Kleindorfer and Li (2005) to take into account the related transmission congestion and also substitute the conditional VaR (CVaR) risk calculation for the VaR measurement. Xu et al. (2006) focused on the issue facing a utility of how to best procure power for its customers. They used semi-variances of spot market transactions to measure risk and offered a model analyzes the procurement situation with different types of power generation and financial tools. In a recent study, Conejo et al. (2008) showed how a power producer can optimize its profits by utilizing forward contracts when they can be signed up to one year in advance. The decision of when to participate in the forward market is a complex one, involving lots of uncertainty over an extensive period of time. The authors developed a stochastic mixed-integer linear programming model, which shows that the deterministic results are inferior to the stochastic ones. In addition, the inclusion of risk leads to a decrease in power bought in the forwards market and an increase in the power sold.
In a similar framework, Kwon et al. (2006) used a two-stage stochastic programming model where the first stage's result is the quantity of forward contracts to buy, and the second stage gives the electric capacity to make or buy in future time periods. IJESM 6,1
Transmission congestion was not considered in the model. Forward contracts are defined as "contracts for differences" because they are the difference between the contract price and the spot price. The difference between this price and a benchmark or target is defined as the risk the buying and selling agents assume by entering into the contract. Transmission congestion is omitted from the model. The main contribution of the paper is a model for a selling agent who can sell incremental amounts of power through long-term contracts combined with contracts from other producers. It allows for "swing options", which means that the buying agent has the option of obtaining whatever quantity of power that he desires up to a maximum quantity. It is assumed that volume requirements for the contract only represent a small percentage of the total output of an electric generating unit. This model is different from the Kleindorfer and Li (2005) in that it only considers the replication of a single custom contract, the time period can be long-term, and no unit commitment decisions are made.
In contrast, the Sen et al. (2006) attempts to help utilities manage their power supply portfolio using the majority of available factors. They explore the effects of deregulating electricity markets, i.e. the focus shift of generators from minimizing costs to developing a power trading strategy. The authors analyze the DASH model for power portfolio optimization in order to determine its worth as a tool to electric utilities. The DASH model is a multi-stage stochastic integer program which recommends future power buying decisions. One of the benefits of the DASH model is that it allows for on-and off-peak modeling. It also can be modified to include several markets for utilities that trade in regions outside of their service territories; the model incorporates heat rates, start-up costs, minimum downtimes, etc.
While the focus of the DASH model and is optimizing available resources, the Murphy and Smeers (2005) article explored capacity expansion. Utilities seek to optimize their generation portfolios in order to have a sufficient amount of baseload, peaking and cycling capacity while minimizing costs. Here fuel costs can still be passed along to the customers and an oligopolistic market (where each player can influence prices) is assumed. The paper is presented based on a two-stage model: in the first stage investment decisions are made and in the second stage operational decisions are made. Forward contracting is not explored and is left for future research. A separate theory (Allaz, 1992; Allaz and Vila, 1993) evaluates the forward commodity markets with market power through an equilibrium model. Constraints include equilibrium conditions and incentives for producers to trade in the forward market before the spot market.
Utilities can use different financial schemes to optimize their situation. Kamat et al. (2002) examined interruptible supply with the current financial environment. It reviewed how utilities treated interruptible contracts historically and argued that the treatment no longer works in deregulated markets. Utilities should view interruptible contracts as comparable to forward contracts, with the stipulation that there are many different ways to enact the contract. Oum et al. (2006) attempted to aid utilities in finding the optimal financial portfolios given a set amount of available resources for additional capacity taking into account fluctuating demand. They addressed the problem of developing an optimal hedging portfolio consisting of forward and options contracts for a risk-averse load-serving entity when price and volumetric risks are present and correlated.
Historically, transmission constraints were viewed mainly as the physical limitation of the transmission line or its maximum thermal load. When markets were regulated, transmission lines were owned and operated by local utilities, and all power sent over Design of power purchase the lines was either owned by the operating utility or wheeled for another utility based on existing agreements. With the advent of deregulation, utilities were forced to wheel other companies' power, which introduced more risk in terms of transmission constraints. Some existing utilities were given FTRs proportional to their load, which would help them to hedge against congestion charges. Utilities could also trade these rights to other entities in FTRs auctions. Much research has been done on different ways to represent transmission constraints. Tseng et al. (1999) presented a method for a deterministic power portfolio problem which takes transmission constraints into account. Based on a DC power flow model, the transmission constraints are formulated as linear constraints. They showed that if the transmission constraints are not considered, the schedule obtained might cause some transmission lines to be overloaded. This may result in rescheduling of some generating units and may incur significant costs. Olmos and Neuhoff (2006) addressed finding a balancing point in a transmission network where companies cannot utilize market power by owning transmission rights. The main assumption was that transmission contracts should only be offered from predetermined balancing points, not from all distinct nodes (or hubs) in a system. Although an actual logical point was not found in the European Union's network, the model is a good start to researching equitable FTRs. Niu et al. (2005) argued that the supply function equilibrium model is more realistic in dealing with the electricity markets due to its more flexible approach to elasticity of demand and parameters. They combined forward contracts, transmission constraints and multi-period strategy into the linear asymmetric supply function equilibrium framework. Transmission congestion rights were explored as a linear combination of forward contracts. Kaymaz et al. (2007) identified transmission constraints as a flowgate, or "a group of lines in the network that has limited flow capability in its lines" that were mainly imposed by the transmission system operator for thermal reasons, voltage considerations or to control the interregional flow of electricity. They assumed that the transmission system operator decides what amount of power needs to be transmitted to each node of the network, considering constraints. Stoft (1999) provided a very good overview of game theory and transmission rights. One important finding is that using Cournot modeling at the nodes may result in ambiguous results because of zero elasticity of demand. The assumption that market power decreases when the number of firms increases may not be correct. Oum et al. (2006) argued that if a generalized Nash equilibrium is used, one may resolve the Cournot ambiguity. Yuan et al. (2005) explored a two bus system with transmission constraints using a Cournot game. Each node (or generator) has an optimal capacity. As long as the transmission line capacity is less than the generator's optimal capacity, there will be a transmission constraint. Their model showed how the generators react to each others' decisions. The optimal solution for one generator is not equal to the optimal solution for the other generator. Given different conditions, the equilibrium solution may vary. In general, profits for both will be higher when transmission constraints exist; conversely, social welfare may decrease.
One distinctive feature of our research is to expand upon existing "power portfolio optimization with risk" literature by introducing a transmission constraint into the model. Historically, transmission congestion has been modeled in different ways including flowgates, transmission rents and FTRs. When markets were regulated, transmission lines were owned and operated by local utilities, and all power sent over IJESM 6,1 the lines was either owned by the operating utility or wheeled for another utility based on existing agreements. With the advent of deregulation, utilities were forced to wheel other companies' power, which introduced more risk in terms of transmission constraints.
Model formulation
The purpose of the model developed in this paper is to determine the profit-maximizing combination of different power purchasing portfolios given transmission constraints and risk tolerance. Rather than using a flowgate constraint as a representation of transmission congestion, FTRs have been utilized. In addition, CVaR was chosen over VaR as a risk measurement for two different reasons. First, it is important to have a good representation of the tradeoff between the best expected profit and the volatility experienced when obtaining that profit. Second, it provides protection against very undesirable scenarios that may occur with low probability. Here it is expressed in terms of the minimum acceptable profit. The difference between the two measures is discussed in more detail below. In order to simplify the FTRs contracts, a three-node network is used with unidirectional flow.
The model incorporates the following prices in power procurement optimization: power purchase agreements, forwards, options, and day-ahead prices. Hull (2006) provides a comprehensive review of derivative instruments. Power purchase agreements are considered the least risky way to procure power. Selling and buying agents agree on a $/MWh price for power purchased over a period of time. Some contracts last as long as 20 years and have provisions that increase the price of the contract to combat inflation. The forward market offers a contract for power whereby the seller and buyer agree on a price for an assessment period in the future. A call option is a contract whereby the buyer has the option, but not the obligation, to buy the power at a certain price (strike price) in the future. A put option is a contract whereby the seller has the option, but not the obligation, to sell the power at a certain price in the future. We chose not to incorporate the put option into our model because our focus is power procurement; therefore, the utility would not be selling power through an options contract. A fee is paid for the option, which is called the premium. The day-ahead prices are set by generator bids the day before the power will be purchased. Figure 1 shows the annual decision process. The demand is unknown at the time the decision is made. We consider the decision maker aims to maximize its profits by determining the optimal way to purchase power at the beginning of the cycle. In January, decisions are made about what instruments to use for power procurement for the summer peak season. In June, July and August the utility must use the instruments that were chosen to procure power. At the end of the year the company evaluates its decisions to determine if it has met its goals in terms of profit and risk.
Input parameters I
A set of all of the financial instruments that could be used to purchase power {spot, forward (for), power purchase agreement (ppa), call, fixed transmission rights (ftr) contract}.
T Time period over which the model is optimized. Here it represents the number of hours in a year {1, . . . , 8760}.
ce tk Execution price/MWh for call asset for time
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a t Price of power purchase agreement contract at time t (t ¼ 1, . . . ,T ).
r tkx FTRs price for time t (t ¼ 1, . . . ,T ) from source node k (k ¼ 1, 2, 3) to sink node x (x ¼ 2, 3, 1).
e tkx Difference between the spot price at node from source node k (k ¼ 1, 2, 3) to sink node x (x ¼ 2, 3, 1) during time t (t ¼ 1, . . . , T ).
G tk Amount (MW) of power to buy on spot market at node k (k ¼ 1, 2, 3) in order to satisfy demand.
, which is assumed to have a triangular distribution with parameters (b low , b median , b high ). The parameters are estimated from the actual data using generalized method of moments.
z Minimum CVaR acceptable at a confidence level of a, where 0 , a , 1.
p t Price at time t (t ¼ 1, . . . ,T ).
l kx Maximum flow allowed from source node k (k ¼ 1, 2, 3) to sink node x (x ¼ 2, 3, 1). 
Decision timeframe
Company uses the instruments that were chosen to procure power.
Company evaluates its decisions to determine if it has met its goals in terms of profit and risk.
Decisions are made about what instruments to use for power procurement for the season.
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Demand constraint
The utility is responsible for meeting its customers' demand at all times:
Transmission constraints Transmission constraints state that one cannot have more capacity on a line than is physically possible. They represent flow in one direction in the network where the capacity that flows into the node must be able to satisfy the capacity demanded at that node. In other words, these are flow-conservation constraints. The left-hand side gives the capacity purchased through instrument i traveling to node k plus the amount of additional power that must be purchased on the spot market to satisfy demand at node k at time t. The right-hand side represents the demand at node k. Figure 2 shows a representation of the network:
Non-negativity constraint Q itkx $ 0 ;i; t; a; j 
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CVaR constraint
CVaR min $ z 4. Data PJM Interconnection was formed in 1927 in order for three utilities in the Pennsylvania/New Jersey area to realize cots savings by giving up coordination of their lines to a central authority and pooling their resources. The main purpose of PJM is to maintain reliability and efficiently manage load to achieve the highest value for its customers. It evolved into a fully functioning ISO with the combination of the introduction of markets in 1996 and locational marginal pricing (LMP) in 1997. PJM has worked to improve and refine its LMP over the years. LMP reflects the price of energy purchases and sales in the PJM market and also the price of transmission congestion charges. It is based on how energy actually flows and system conditions, not on some optimal power flow between nodes. LMP equals the marginal cost of generation plus the transmission congestion cost plus the cost of marginal losses. The marginal cost is defined as the cost to serve the next megawatt (MW) of load; it depends on the marginal cost to operate the power generators, total demand on the system and the cost of delivering energy on transmission system. The marginal loss is the change in megawatt capacity due to current flowing through resistance. Losses can be increased by lower voltage, longer lines or higher current. PJM started using actual marginal losses (rather than estimated losses) in its calculation of LMP on June 1, 2006. The congestion price represents the price of congestion for binding constraints. It is calculated using the cost of marginal units controlling constraints and sensitivity factors on each bus.
The economic dispatch model used by PJM works in the following manner. First, PJM receives all generation offers for the next day. PJM then stacks the offers by price and looks at load forecast for the next day. The question is asked, "How much generation do we need?" PJM starts with the cheapest generator bids and systematically moves upward in price until the projected load is met. Therefore, the generation is marginal cost the next day is the lowest bid per MW that satisfies load; it is also the price if there is no congestion.
The main cause for transmission congestion is when there are thermal limits being violated on a line. The dispatcher can choose from three actions when this occurs. His first choice is system reconfiguration, such as opening normally closed breakers. This choice is the best option because it can be done without dispatching generation out of merit order. Second, the dispatcher can initiate transaction curtailment. The procedure is to look at transactions where the owner is not willing to pay congestion and any of these that has 5 percent effect or greater on easing the constraint will be curtailed. The final option is to re-dispatch generation. The dispatcher can take some generator and run it out of merit order because it is more advantageously located on the power system. The goal is to choose the most cost-effective unit to control the constraint. This strategy is also known as "security constrained dispatch" where delivery limitations prevent the use of "next least-cost generator" so the higher-cost generator located closer to load must be used.
The data that are analyzed with the model were obtained from Platts' database. Platts is an energy information company with headquarters in New York; its database is maintained by a group of energy analysts based in Denver. The information IJESM 6,1 included in the database ranges from commodities pricing data to tracking of proposed infrastructure projects All data, with the exception of the Platts Megawatt Daily forward prices, are publicly available on the PJM or New York Mercantile Exchange web sites. PJM is used for the analysis because it is a mature independent system operator with FTRs auctions, nodal pricing data and the methodology behind its pricing and FTRs markets. PJM is used for the analysis because it is a mature independent system operator with FTRs auctions and nodal pricing data. The data include PJM hourly day-ahead prices for Valid sources and sinks for the PJM FTRs auction are limited to: hubs, zones, aggregates, interface buses, load buses and generator buses. PJM hubs are reference nodes at which standard energy goods are traded. Hubs serve as a common point, or reference price, for commercial trading. The hubs are fixed weighted averages of the LMP at a set of typical buses for the chosen area. Hub prices are demonstrative of the PJM market, are fairly steady under many system conditions and are not interfered with by local transmission confines or system topology variations. Zones are a collection of load-weighted LMPs and correspond to transmission zones. Each participating electric distribution company has its own transmission zone through which it supplies its customers. An aggregate node represents a portion of the nodes that exist in the zones. The node is created at the request of the distribution utility and can be either generation-or load-weighted. Interface buses are those which connect two adjacent transmission areas. Generator buses are located adjacent to the major generating units within PJM.
Each FTRs is classified as an obligation, which means that the selling entity is allocated the FTRs based on its load. Since the focus of the problem is from a utility's perspective, the sign on the peak prices is changed to represent what the FTRs is worth to the selling agent. The third network is comprised of the nodes: Greenbri138 KV T1, Hinton 138 KV T1, and Roncever138 KV T1T3T5. These nodes are located in the American Electric Power (AEP) zone in West Virginia and belong to one of its subsidiary utilities, Appalachian Power. Greenbri138 KV T1, Hinton 138 KV T1 and Roncever138 KV T1T3T5 all represent load nodes. Table I shows the data. Table II shows the basic metrics for the day-ahead prices in the selected time period.
The Platts Megawatt Daily forward prices are collected from a random anonymous selection of market participants. They indicate the trade date, the assessment period, Design of power purchase whether the agreement is for peak/off peak power and the price in dollars per megawatt-hour. Table III shows the metrics for the 2007 summer peak trades for the AEP Dayton Hub, which is chosen due to its relative proximity to the nodes. Plus, the nodes are managed by Appalachian Power, which is a subsidiary of AEP. Forward data are available for power bought up to 12 months before power delivery, but only the forwards that are purchased up to five months were used; it is assumed that a utility begins to think about summer peak season in January of the same year. In order to obtain nodal level data for the forward prices, a spread between the day-ahead price for the AEP Hub and the price for each node is calculated. That spread is then multiplied with the AEP forward price in order to obtain a unique forward price for each node.
Finally, the New York Mercantile Exchange (Nymex) provides monthly futures contracts to customers based on the daily floating price for each peak day of the month at the AEP-Dayton Hub. Additional hedging opportunities are offered through options on the contracts. The following snapshot is a sample of the data available via Nymex.
In general, the unit of measurement for transmission lines is considered to be kilovolts (kV). This study's chosen unit of measurement (megawatts -MW) cannot be directly converted from kilovolts, as one must know the amperes involved and power factor of the generation. In a 2006 filing with the Utah Public Service Commission, PacifiCorp (a local electric utility) makes a generalization that a 138 kV transmission line can carry around 200 MW of new capacity. The same generalization is used in this paper.
Fixed transmission rights
FTRs are financial contracts that entitle the holder to a stream of revenues (or charges) based on the hourly energy price differences across the path. Unfortunately, LMP exposes PJM market participants to price uncertainty for congestion cost charges. Also during constrained conditions, the PJM market collects more from loads than it pays generators. Load is at the receiving end of the constraint. The solution is to buy FTRs, One possibility is that they create a financial hedge that provides price certainty to market participants when delivering energy across the PJM system. They can also provide firm transmission service without congestion cost. Another option is to provide a methodology to allocate congestion charges to those who pay the fixed cost of the PJM transmission system.
There are four different methods by which companies can obtain FTRs. Network service is an obligation FTR that is annually allocated for entities with load. Utilities are allowed up to annual peak load but can also opt out of the obligation. The FTRs are designated as the path from resources to aggregate loads. Firm point-to-point service, which is an option FTR, may be requested with transmission reservation. It is designated as the transmission line from source to sink. The secondary market is where bilateral trading takes place. FTRs that exist are bought or sold on this market. Finally, the FTR auction is a centralized market where entities can purchase "left over" capability. Entities that wish to sell FTRs can also put them into the auction rather than do it on the secondary market.
The economic value of FTRs is determined by hourly day-ahead LMPs. A benefit (credit) is applied when the FTR is in the same direction as congested flow. In contrast, a liability (charge) occurs when the FTR is in the opposite direction as congested flow. The Congestion Charge is MW times the difference between day-ahead sink LMP and day-ahead source LMP. Therefore, the point-to-point FTR credit is MW times the difference between day-ahead sink LMP and day-ahead source LMP. Network service is calculated a bit differently. Its FTR credit is MW times the difference between day-ahead aggregate load LMP and day-ahead generation bus LMPs.
Network service companies specify designated network generating resources (sources) and aggregate loads (sink) up to value of peak load. Point-to-point transmission service customers specify the MW amount, transaction receipt (source) and delivery (sink) points. FTRs are for the same duration as associated firm point-to-point transmission service -either daily, weekly, monthly, or annually. The FTR is optional in that the company is not required to have it, but requests MW capacity up to its transmission service MW level.
Results
The nonlinear stochastic mixed-integer model is run using the Premium Solver tool in Microsoft Excel, that performs numerical optimization using quadratic approach to obtain initial estimates and quasi-Newton method at each iteration to determine the direction of the search. Table IV shows the results.
All three nodes arrive at an optimal solution with the same strategy -the one in which the utility has a fairly high percentage of its power coming from fixed-price power contracts and purchases the majority of the rest of its needed power in the five-month forward market and in options. Rather than using the spot market, the utility estimates the max peak for the following month and purchases one-month forward contracts for that amount. The only spot purchased is for the extra demand at the Hinton node in order to satisfy the transmission constraint. The Hinton node generally has a negative profit because of the unfavorable conditions of the financial transmission rights contract from the Greenbri138 node to the Hinton node and because of the additional demand at Hinton that must be satisfied through the spot market.
The main role of this study is the addition of transmission-related constraints to the power portfolio optimization problem. This contribution is satisfied in two main ways: a transmission constraint to make a unidirectional three-node system and FTRs that are included in the objective function. The question remains if the constraint and FTRs affect the overall solution and whether they are worthwhile. The model is run three additional times: once with transmission constraint, once with FTRs and once with neither. Table V presents the results.
The FTRs have a larger impact on the objective function than the transmission constraint. The model without FTRs has a profit function that is about 80 percent higher than the model with FTRs included. Omitting the transmission constraint only contributes to around an eight percent increase in profits. When both FTRs and the transmission constraint are dropped from the model, profits just about double. This result signifies that the FTRs contribute greatly to the extreme losses in the tail of the profit distribution and that the transmission considerations in the model do make a difference in the overall optimization. A utility not only has to take into consideration what its customers' needs will be in the future but also how to optimally deliver the power to its customers. There is not only risk involved with the financial instruments chosen but also with the uncertainty of transmission conditions.
Conclusion
We consider power portfolio problem in a multi-period setting to determine the profit-maximizing combination of different power purchasing plans for a given set of transmission constraints and risk tolerance. Rather than using a flowgate constraint as a representation of transmission congestion, we use FTRs. A model is introduced that involves a three-node unidirectional network in order to evaluate the significance of transmission constraints. We use data from the PJM, which is located in the eastern 
